The State of Utah v. Frederick Joseph Germonto : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. Frederick Joseph Germonto :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Christine Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Curtis C. Nesset; Nygaard, Coke and Vincent; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Germonto, No. 900375.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3162
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO, ) Case No. 900375 
) Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree 
felony; for robbery, a second degree felony, and for 
forgery, a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding 
CURTIS C. NESSET (#4238) 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
33 3 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: 328-2506 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
No. 
INTRODUCTION 1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW. . . 2 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT I - THE ROBBERY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE 
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE 
THAT THE ROBBERY WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS 
OF FORCE OR FEAR. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE 
ROBBERY CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
POINT II -
B. 
MR. GERMONTO'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE 
INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO OBJECT 
TO THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER REFERENCES 
TO CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MR. 
GERMONTO'S PRETRIAL SILENCE AND BECAUSE 
THEY FAILED TO PRESENT THE DEFENSE OF 
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
Mr. Germonto's trial counsel should have 
obj ected to the prosecutor' s, improper use 
of Mr. Germonto's pretrial silence and 
the prosecutor's reference to privileged 
attorney-client communications 
Defense counsel were ineffective because 
they failed to present the defense of 
voluntary intoxication 
16 
CONCLUSION 
17 
25 
26 
1. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
No. 
CASES CITED 
Branch v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E. 2d 758 (Va. 1983). . . . 12 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) 23, 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
133-34 (3rd Cir 1984) 3, 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 1 S.E. 2d 300, 302 (Va. 1939). . . 13 
People v. Pack, 341 N.E. 2d 4 (111. St. App. 1976). . . . 12 
People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 459, 126 N.E. 2d 559, 
562 (1955) 21 
People v. Tiller, 447 N.E. 2d 174 (111. 1982) 11 
State v. Alexander, 503 P.2d 777 (Ariz. 1972) 21 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989) 3 
State v. Holsinger, 601 P.2d 1054 (Ariz. 1979) 21 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487, (Utah Ct. App 1991). 3, 
State v. Lopez, 762 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1988) 13 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). . 3 
State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) 2, 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976) 2 
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983) 2 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 265-66 (Utah 1988) . . 26 
State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) 3, 
State v. Ulibarri, 668 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1983) 14 
State v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 232, 235 (Ariz. 1986) 14 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). . . . 16 
State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981) 24 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah) 26 
ii. 
Page 
No. 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated §76-2-306 < 25 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-203 1,4 
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 (1990) 4, 5 
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-412(1)(a) (1990) 14 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-501 (1990) 4 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(i)(1992) 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Rule of Evidence, Rule 504 + 20 
iii. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ; 
vs. 
FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO, 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
i Case No. 900375 
i priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to this Court's Order of February 3, 1992, 
Appellantfs alternative counsel files this Supplemental Brief to 
be considered in addition to the brief filed by Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association (LDA), and the pro se brief filed by the 
Appellant, Frederick Joseph Germonto. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(i) (1992) which grants original appellate jurisdiction 
to the Utah Supreme Court over appeals in criminal cases from the 
district court "involving a conviction of a first degree or capi-
tal felony . . . ." The defendant, Mr. Germonto, was convicted of 
second degree homicide, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented in this brief for 
review: 
1. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion 
to dismiss the robbery charge at the end of the State's case 
because there was no taking by force or fear as required by the 
statute? If the defendant's motion to dismiss was correctly 
denied, then was the robbery conviction supported by sufficient 
evidence? 
2. Were defendant's trial counsel ineffective because 
they (a) failed to object to questions and arguments by the 
prosecutor which improperly used information subject to the 
attorney-client privilege and amounted to improper comment on Mr. 
Germonto's right to remain silent and (b) failed to adequately 
present the defense of voluntary intoxication? 
A defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the 
State's case in chief requires a trial court to determine whether 
the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in 
his defense. State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). In 
order to survive a motion to dismiss the prosecution must 
establish a prima facie case. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 
(Utah 1976). That means the prosecution must present some 
evidence of every element needed to make out a cause of action. 
State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985). 
Insufficiency of evidence claims require an appellate 
court to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). If the 
evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, the 
appellate court must reverse the conviction. State v. Moore, 802 
P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
With respect to the second issue presented, an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question 
of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487, (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Where 
no claim of ineffectiveness has been presented to the trial court, 
an appellate court may review the record to determine on appeal 
whether counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance 
as a matter of law. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 
748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3rd Cir 1984); Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Any statutes, rules or constitutional provisions relevant 
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS^ 
Frederick Joseph Germonto was convicted by a jury on May 
8, 1990, of murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990); robbery, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1990); 
and forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-501 (1990). The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr. 
Germonto. to a term of five years to life for homicide, to run 
consecutively with two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years 
for each of the second degree felonies. (R. 285-90) Mr. Germonto 
had been represented at the trial by attorneys from the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association. (R. 17-18) 
The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association filed an opening 
brief on behalf of Mr. Germonto raising five issues. Several 
months thereafter, Mr. Germonto filed his own "supplementary 
brief" which added six more issues including ineffective assis-
tance of counsel on the part of the trial attorneys from LDA. 
The State subsequently moved to strike Mr. Germonto's 
pro se brief. However, in an order issued on February 3, 1992, 
this Court denied the State's motion to strike Mr. Germonto's 
brief but the Court "advised" LDA to withdraw as Mr. Germonto's 
counsel and allow "alternative" counsel to represent him. 
Alternative counsel was ordered to "examine and evaluate" the 
briefs already filed on Mr. Germonto's behalf and "to file any 
additional briefing." (The court's order is attached as Addendum 
A.) In accord with the order, Mr. Germonto's alternative counsel 
files this supplemental brief to be considered with the two briefs 
already filed.1 
!Mr. Germonto has requested that his brief not be withdrawn. In 
FACTS 
The facts are adequately set forth in the opening brief 
filed by the LDA and will not be repeated here except where 
supplementation is necessary to clarify the issues raised by this 
brief.2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Germonto contends that the trial court should have 
dismissed the robbery charge at the conclusion of the State's 
case. In the alternative, Mr. Germonto asserts that the robbery 
conviction is supported by insufficient evidence. In either case, 
there is no evidence that a taking was accomplished by force or 
fear as required by the statute because the victim was 
unconscious, and perhaps dead, when Mr. Germonto formed the intent 
to take certain items. 
Mr. Germonto contends that his trial attorneys were 
ineffective. The attorneys failed to object to the prosecutor's 
reference during cross-examination and in closing argument to a 
confidential communication between Mr. Germonto and his attorneys. 
consideration of this request and the validity of the issues 
raised by LDA in its opening brief and the investigation conducted 
by alternative counsel, alternative counsel has chosen to file 
this additional supplemental brief rather than withdraw either or 
both of the preceding briefs. 
2In order to promote clarity and prevent confusion, this brief 
adopts the record numbering system contained in the opening brief 
of LDA. Brief of Appellant at v. in that system the following 
enumeration of the various transcripts is used: 
Furthermore, the attorneys failed to object to the prosecutor's 
references to Mr. Germonto's post-arrest/pre-trial silence. 
Furthermore, even though Mr. Germonto testified that he was under 
the influence of drugs at the time of the killing, his attorneys 
failed to develop or request instructions concerning the defense 
of voluntary intoxication. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ROBBERY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION 
FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE 
ROBBERY WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF FORCE 
OR FEAR. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ROBBERY 
CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
District Court pleadings file . . . R. 
Preliminary Hearing transcript 7/19/89 . P.H. 
Motion transcript 10/31/89 (Misdated on cover sheet 10/31/90) 
(R. 310) . . . M.l 
Motion transcript 11/13/89 (R. 314) 
Motion transcript 11/20/89 (R. 315) 
Motion transcript 12/29/89 (R. 316) 
Motion transcript 1/30/90 (R. 311) 
Motion transcript 2/2/90 (R.313) 
Trial transcript 5/1/90 (R. 305) 
Trial transcript 5/2/90 (R. 306) 
Trial transcript 5/3/90 (R. 307) 
Trial transcript 5/4/90 (R. 309) 
Trial transcript 5/8/90 (R. 308) 
. . M.2 
. . M.3 
. . M.4 
. M.5 
M.6 
T.l 
T.2 
T.3 
T.4 
T.5 
At the end of the State's case, M£. Germonto's counsel 
moved to dismiss all the charges, including the robbery charge 
based on the lack of evidence to support the various charges and 
the lack of intent. (T.4 at 106) The trial court subsequently 
denied the defense motion to dismiss. (T.4 at 109) Ultimately, 
Mr. Germonto was convicted of robbery. (R. 275) However, as will 
be argued below, the robbery charge was unsupported by the evi-
dence and as a matter of law, a robbery was not proven because the 
prosecution failed to establish all of the necessary elements. In 
order for a charge in a criminal case to be submitted to the jury, 
"it is necessary that the prosecution present some evidence of 
every element needed to make out a cause off action." State v. 
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985). Therefore, Mr. Germonto 
argues that either the trial court should have dismissed the rob-
bery charge at the end of the State's case or the conviction is 
unsupported. In any event, the charge shoiild have never been sub-
mitted to the jury because of the prosecution's failure to prove 
all of the elements. 
Mr. Germonto was charged and convicted of robbery, a sec-
ond degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 
(1990). That provision states: 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional tak-
ing of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force 
or fear. 
While the prosecution adduced evidence during its case in chief 
that Mr. Germonto had taken items that belonged to Mr. Lisonbee, 
it presented no evidence that the items were taken by force or 
fear as required by the statute. 
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence which indi-
cated that an individual who had visited Mr. Lisonbee earlier in 
the morning noticed that Mr. Lisonbee was wearing the ring which 
Mr. Germonto ultimately stated that he took. (T.2 at 45) Mr. 
Germonto admitted taking the ring, although he stated that the 
ring was not on Mr. Lisonbee's hand when he took it, and Mr. 
Lisonbee1s checkbook, but denied taking Mr. Lisonbeefs wallet. 
(T.4 at 150, 206-08) The State adduced no evidence that Mr. 
Germonto went to Mr. Lisonbeefs home on January 9, 1988, with the 
intention of hurting or taking anything from Mr. Lisonbee. 
In responding to the defense motion to dismiss the rob-
bery charge, the prosecutor stated that the robbery charge should 
not be dismissed because: 
As far as robbery is concerned, I think the 
evidence is clear that at or about the time that 
Mr. Lisonbee died, there were items taken from 
his — presumably — inferentially from his body. 
The evidence at the scene would indicate that 
there were rooms gone through and a check book 
was taken. We have recovered that check book, 
and I think we have tied that to the defendant. 
(T.4 at 108) The prosecution presented no evidence which demon-
strated that Mr. Germonto fulfilled the statutory elements of rob-
bery by taking the ring and/or check book from "the person or 
immediate presence" of Mr. Lisonbee "against his will" "by means 
of force or fear." 
Mr. Germonto, the only witness to the events, categori-
cally denied that he went to Mr. Lisonbee'£ house on the day in 
question to take anything. (T.4 at 159) Mr. Germonto testified 
that he went to Mr. Lisonbee's house to seek assistance in renting 
an apartment because he knew that Mr. Lisonbee was a landlord. 
(T.4 at 132) Mr. Germonto testified that after arriving at Mr. 
Lisonbee1s house on January 9, 1988, he talked with Mr. Lisonbee 
and then volunteered to repair Mr. Lisonbee's broken toilet. 
(T.4 at 135-36) Mr. Lisonbee apparently noticed that Mr. Germonto 
was acting erratically and asked if he were taking drugs. (T.4 at 
137) When Mr. Germonto replied that he had taken some "weird 
speed" that morning, Mr. Lisonbee abruptly left the bathroom 
where Mr. Germonto was working. (T.4 at 138) Mr. Germonto testi-
fied that when he followed Mr. Lisonbee intending to assuage Mr. 
Lisonbee's concern about the drugs, he found Mr. Lisonbee with a 
large knife in his hand. (T.4 at 138) Mr. Lisonbee yelled at Mr. 
Germonto, cut Mr. Germonto's hand with the knife, and pushed him 
to the ground. (T.4 at 140-41) Mr. Germonto got back on his feet 
and, when Mr. Lisonbee insisted that he leave, stated that he 
would if he could just get his coat. (T.4 sit 14 3) Mr. Germonto 
testified that Mr. Lisonbee approached him with the knife. (T.4 
at 143-44) Mr. Germonto testified that as Mr. Lisonbee approached 
him with the knife he became fearful and hit Mr. Lisonbee with the 
wrench he had been using to repair the toilet. (T.4 at 144-45) 
Mr. Germonto said that he subsequently lost consciousness 
and did not remember the events which followed but it must be 
assumed that during this time Mr. Lisonbee was beaten by Mr. 
Germonto. (T.4 at 146) The next thing that Mr. Germonto remem-
bers was regaining consciousness with Mr. Lisonbee lying on the 
living room floor, bleeding and unmoving. (T.4 at 146) The house 
was in disarray. (T.4 at 146) At this point, Mr. Germonto testi-
fied that he began to realize the gravity of his actions. (T.4 at 
148) He took the knife which was lying beside Mr. Lisonbee into 
the kitchen so that Lisonbee could not get up and "get" him. (T.4 
at 147) Mr. Germonto next described running into the bathroom to 
wash his bleeding hand and then returning to the living room. 
(T.4 at 148) Mr. Germonto then removed bedding and covered Mr. 
Lisonbee with it. (T.4 at 149) Next, Mr. Germonto testified that 
he attempted to change into a pair of Mr. Lisonbee!s pants but 
discovered that they were too long. (T.4 at 150) It was only at 
this point that Mr. Germonto stated that he took a ring and a 
check book which he testified he saw lying on the counter as he 
was on his way out of the house. (T.4 at 150) Mr. Germonto tes-
tified that he took the items because he needed to buy a bus 
ticket to leave town. (T.4 at 151) Later Mr. Germonto wrote one 
of Mr. Lisonbee's checks to himself for $27 3.00 and eventually 
cashed that check. (T.4 at 152-58) During closing argument the 
prosecution argued that Mr. Germonto should be found guilty of 
robbery because "he robbed Mr. Lisonbee after he killed him...." 
(T.5 at 46) 
The Utah robbery statute requires that the taking be 
accomplished by the use of force or fear. However, if a victim is 
-10-
dead, no force or fear is used in the taking. This Court has 
apparently never addressed the issue of whether a person who has 
been murdered can subsequently be robbed. However, several courts 
in other states have addressed this question with differing 
results. Mr. Germonto now argues that because of the phrasing of 
the Utah robbery statute, if an individual has been murdered with-
out an intent by the perpetrator to facilitate a robbery, then a 
subsequent taking of the victim's belongings by the perpetrator 
cannot be a robbery. The crimes committed by the perpetrator 
amount to a homicide and a theft, but not a homicide and a 
robbery. Robbery can only be accomplished subsequent to the homi-
cide if the homicide was perpetrated in order to promote the 
taking. 
In People v. Tiller, 447 N.E.2d 174 (111. 1982), the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be held 
accountable for the armed robbery of a homicide victim because the 
force directed against the victim was not for the purpose of 
obtaining property from her through force or intimidation as 
required by the robbery statute. Rather, the evidence indicated 
that the initial force against the victim was to prevent her from 
identifying the defendant as her assailant. 447 N.E.2d at 180-81. 
The court stated: 
To sustain a charge of armed robbery it is 
essential that the robber use violence or fear of 
violence as the means to take property in the 
control of the victim. 
The evidence does not show bqyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the violence exertdd in this case 
was used as a means to take [property from the 
homicide victim]. A more severe penalty is 
imposed for robbery than for theft because a 
great danger exists that the robberfs threat of 
force or violence will lead to death or great 
bodily harm. Taking advantage of an existing 
threat, where that threat was not delivered to 
persuade the victim to release control of 
property, creates no additional danger of great 
bodily harm. 
447 N.E.2d at 181. The court concluded that the use of force 
against the victim was for a purpose other than to take property 
from her and thus, the defendant could not be convicted of 
robbery. See also People v. Pack, 341 N.E.2d 4 (111. Ct. App. 
1976) ("Force was used against the victim with the intent to kill, 
not to steal. The subsequent taking of property, apparently an 
afterthought, established only theft ... .") 
In Branch v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 758 (Va. 1983), the 
defendant had attempted to mediate a conflict which had arisen 
during a drinking party at his house. 300 S.E.2d at 759. 
However, when one of the combatants spurned the defendant's offer 
of compromise, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and 
killed the victim. The victim was then dragged into a bedroom and 
wrapped in a blanket. The defendant went through the victim's 
pockets and removed a wallet containing identification cards. The 
defendant was convicted of homicide, robbery, and the use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony. 300 S.E.2d at 758. In the 
Virginia Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that the intent to steal the wallet was 
contemporaneous with the shooting. The Commonwealth argued that 
the precise sequence of events or lapse of time between the homi-
cide and the robbery was unimportant so loiig as "all of the ele-
ments necessary to show robbery . . • are present." 300 S.E.2d 
at 759. In prior cases, the court had held that it "must look to 
the intention as it existed at the time of the taking rather than 
to its formation subsequently." 300 S.E.2d at 760, quoting Jones 
v. Commonwealth, 1 S.E.2d 300, 302 (Va. 1939). The court then 
stated: 
The principal elements of robbery, a crime 
against the person of the victim are the taking, 
the intent to steal, and the violence (or 
intimidation). Definitionally, there is a tempo-
ral correlation among these elements. The vio-
lence must occur before or at the time of the 
taking. The intent to steal and 1}he taking must 
coexist. And the offense is not rtobbery unless 
the animus furandi was conceived before or at the 
time the violence was committed. 
Here, . . . the question is Whether robbery 
was the motive for the killing. [The defendant's] 
conduct, both before and after the killing, 
negates any inference that he had conceived an 
intent to rob at the time he shot his victim. 
300 S.E.2d at 759-60. Because the defendant possessed no intent 
to steal at the moment he shot the victim, the court held that the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of la^ to support the 
defendant's conviction of robbery. 300 S.E.2d at 760. 
Finally, in State v. Lopez, 762 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1988), 
the defendant asserted that the taking of a homicide victim's car 
and billfold could not constitute "armed robbery" because the 
items were taken after the victim's death and there was no 
evidence that the earlier use of force against the victim was 
accompanied by an intent to commit a robbery. 762 P.2d at 550. 
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the evidence must establish 
that the defendant's intent to commit robbery coexisted with use 
of force against the victim. Id. Because no evidence demon-
strated that the defendant's use of force was intended to coerce 
the victim to surrender either of the items which were ultimately 
taken, the court held the defendant could not be found guilty of 
robbery. 762 P.2d at 551. See also State v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 
232, 235 (Ariz. 1986) ("....to establish a factual basis for 
[armed robbery], it must be shown that defendant (1) while armed 
with a deadly weapon, (2) took property from another person 
against that person's will, and (3) in the course of taking the 
property, defendant threatened or used force against that person 
with the intent to deprive them of their property.") 
This Court has previously held that the use of force must 
be "concurrent or concomitant with the taking" to constitute a 
robbery. State v. Ulibarri, 668 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1983). 
Clearly, a more severe penalty is imposed for robbery than for 
theft because a robber's threat of force or violence poses a 
greater danger to a victim than does a simple theft. Therefore, 
only the theft of items of great value merits punishment as a sec-
ond degree felony. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1)(a) On the other 
hand a robbery involving the taking of an item of any value merits 
at least the punishment of a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-301(2) A robbery in which a weapon is used or which results 
in injury is punished even more severely. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-302(2) This reveals a legislative focus on the danger 
involved in robbery crimes. In a case such as this, where the 
victim is either unconscious or already dead at the time the tak-
ing occurs and the force previously used against the victim was 
not intended to promote the taking of the property, the concern 
posed by robbery is not present. A robbery has not been committed 
if the taking is merely an afterthought. 
In this case, the evidence revealed that Mr. Germonto had 
already killed Mr. Lisonbee before he formulated the intent to 
take Mr. Lisonbee1s check book and ring, there was no evidence to 
indicate that force was directed against Mtf. Lisonbee to promote a 
taking. Indeed, even the prosecutor argued that the items were 
taken after Mr. Lisonbee was unconscious or dead. (T.5 at 46) 
Therefore, the essential element of a taking accomplished by force 
or fear is simply not present. Mr. Germonto should not have been 
convicted of robbery and indeed, the case should not have gone to 
the jury because the trial court should have granted the defense 
motion to dismiss the charge. 
Additionally, because the robbery conviction was unsup-
ported by the evidence but could have formed the basis for the 
second degree homicide conviction, that conViction should also be 
set aside. If the jury opted to find Mr. Germonto guilty of sec-
ond degree murder under the felony murder option submitted to 
them, then because there was no legal basis for the robbery 
conviction, the second degree homicide conviction should also 
fail. See Brief of Appellant submitted by LDA at 9-12. 
POINT II 
MR. GERMONTO!S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE 
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER REFERENCES TO 
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MR. GERMONTO'S 
PRETRIAL SILENCE AND BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO 
PRESENT THE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION. 
Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are addressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings; 
however, in some circumstances the claims may be raised on direct 
appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App 1991). 
Such circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new 
counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issues. 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 
(3rd Cir 1984). The circumstances are present for this Court to 
review the ineffectiveness claim raised in this case on direct 
appeal. 
In cases involving ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts 
have adopted the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984): 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors wer^ so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. 
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). In 
short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must demon-
strate deficient performance which resulted in prejudice. 
A. Mr. Germonto's Trial Counsel Should Have Objected to the 
Prosecutor's Improper Use of Mr. Germonto's Pretrial Silence and 
The Prosecutor's Reference to Privileged Attorney-Client 
Communications. 
At the end of the motion hearing held on January 30, 
1990, approximately one week before the scheduled beginning of the 
trial, Mr. Germonto indicated to the court that he had some 
written information to present to the courts (M.5 at 10) The 
trial judge suggested that defense counsel examine the information 
first. After a recess, defense counsel indicated that there was 
no need to present the information to the ttial court. (M.5 at 
10) Defense counsel soon filed a motion fot a continuance 
alleging that they were made aware of new information by the 
written communication of January 30, 1990, and that it would be 
impossible for them to be prepared to go to trial on the scheduled 
date because the entire posture of the case had changed. (R. 115) 
At a hearing on this motion on February 2, 1990, defense counsel 
related the following: 
That information [of January 30] totally, 
totally and completely changes our defense in 
this case. Totally changes the foctis from one 
thing to another. 
We have previously subpoenaed something in 
the area of eighteen or nineteen witnesses. We 
have done significant investigation, significant 
preparation, and were planning to, and prepared 
to go forward this coming Tuesday with the 
defense that we had previously prepared. 
Because of the new information that became 
available to us, that defense, frankly, got 
thrown out the window, and we have a new defense 
which is going to require investigation, and 
very probably psychological evaluation of Mr. 
Germonto . . . . 
(M.6 at 3-4) Even though he had not read it, the prosecutor also 
acknowledged the surprising nature of the written information 
provided by Mr. Germonto and characterized it as "a bomb shell." 
The trial court granted the defense's continuance. (M.6 at 6) 
At trial, the prosecutor established that Mr. Germonto 
had reviewed the police reports in the case and implied that he 
had contrived the story given during his testimony to fit the 
evidence contained in the police reports. (T.4 at 195-96, 208) 
The prosecutor asked Mr. Germonto: "When did you first tell any-
body about this, 'he-attacked-me-with-a-knife1 part of the story?" 
(T.4 at 226) Mr. Germonto explained that it occurred after a 
period of religious meditation and that he had written a letter to 
his attorney which was directed to the trial judge explaining all 
of the things about which he had testified. (T.4 at 226) The 
prosecutor then asked when that letter was written; Mr. Germonto 
replied a couple of months prior to trial. (T.4 at 227) After the 
prosecutor mistakenly identified the date of the letter as 
February, 1990, the prosecutor asked: "When were you arrested for 
this offense?" (T.4 at 227) Mr. Germonto replied that he had 
been arrested a year before the trial. Defense counsel made no 
objection to this exchange between the prosecutor and Mr. 
Germonto. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued: 
Just as Germonto didnft even come up with self-
defense until four months ago, he didn't even tell 
his attorneys until then. And he |came up with 
that after he had had an opportunity to read all 
of the police reports about what was found where, 
and who said what. A number of police reports. 
He knew what the scene looked like in those 
reports. He didn't even talk about self-defense 
until four months ago. Before that this case was 
a who-done-it? It is not at this point, because 
of something he has come up with in just the last 
little while. 
I would submit to you that the defendant's 
testimony reveals a man who has had an opportunity 
to read the police reports, and hei is intelligent. 
I don't know very many people who have gone to 
college at the age of 14. And I would submit to 
you that in the time from his arrest on this 
offense that the testified, that h^ fashioned a 
story that he thinks covers the bases. It covers 
the bases with regard to the offence and self-
defense, that's all he ever told you was self-
defense. And he did not fashion this story or 
communicate it to any one, including his attorney, 
until February of [1990]. Some eight months after 
his arrest for these offenses. 
(T.5 at 31-34) Again, no objection was mad$ by defense counsel to 
the prosecutor's comments. 
Mr. Germonto's counsel should have objected not only on 
the basis of the breach of the attorney-clidnt privilege but also 
because the prosecutor's question and argument amounted to 
improper comment on the defendant's right to remain silent after 
his arrest. The LDA brief raises the issue of the prosecutor's 
breach of the attorney-client privilege in the context of plain 
error at pages 22-27 but does not address the issue of the 
defendant's right to remain silent. 
While the current Rule of Evidence, Rule 504, was inap-
plicable at the time of the defendant's trial, it is nevertheless 
instructive with regard to the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege. That rule states: 
(a) Definitions 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by 
the lawyer in the course of representing the 
client and includes disclosures of the client 
and the client's representatives to the lawyer 
or the lawyer's representative incidental to the 
professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not 
intended to be disclosed to third persons other 
than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance 
of the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client or those reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has 
the privilege to refuse to disclose and to pre-
vent any other person from disclosing confiden-
tial communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client between the client and 
the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyers' 
representatives, and lawyers' representing mat-
ters of common interest, and among the client's 
representatives, lawyers, lawyers' 
representatives, and lawyers representing others 
in matters of common interest, in any 
combination. 
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and concerns 
communication between the attorney and the client. The reason for 
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the privilege is not to protect the client; but to foster free and 
open exchange of information between the attorney and the client. 
State v. Alexander, 503 P.2d 777 (Ariz. 19f72). 
The defendant in a criminal case floes not waive the 
attorney-client privilege when he takes thfc stand to testify in 
his own behalf. As the New York Court of Appeals noted in People 
v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 459, 126 N.E. 2d 559, 562 (1955): 
To say that the broad protection tof [the attorney-
client privilege] is not available to a defendant 
when he takes the stand in a criminal case would 
entail consequences far more detrimental to the 
interest of society than does the'rejection of the 
evidence that might be disclosed. When the 
crimes, asks for 
he should be 
client, especially one accused of 
advice and guidance the premises,I 
able to speak freely without any tear and in full 
confidence that what is said by him or to him by 
his attorney will not be subsequently subject to 
disclosure if he takes the witnes^ stand during 
the trial of his case. Any other Ipolicy than 
strict inviolability, unless expressly waived, would 
seriously hamper the administration of justice, so 
the client would perhaps refrain ijrom telling the 
truth or withhold the truth, whil^ the lawyer 
would be reluctant to give the correct advice and 
counsel if he thought it would be subject to dis-
closure in the event his client took the stand to 
testify in his own behalf. 
In State v. Holsinqer, 601 P.2d 10154 (Ariz. 1979), the 
Arizona Supreme Court reversed a first degree homicide conviction 
because certain questions asked by the proslecutor on cross-exami-
nation of the defendant improperly infringed on the attorney-
client privilege and thereby prejudiced her in the eyes of the 
jury. 601 P.2d at 1058-59. Specifically, the prosecutor asked 
the defendant questions concerning the number of times she had had 
conversations with her attorneys concerning the case and whether 
she had ever discussed the content of the state's case against 
her with her attorneys. 601 P.2d at 1058. The court held that 
the prosecutor's question was prejudicial to the defendant's case. 
601 P.2d at 1059. 
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client; 
however, because of his or her training and experience, it is the 
duty of the attorney to know when invocation of the privilege is 
proper. In this case, defense counsel made no objection to the 
prosecutor's initial inquiry to Mr. Germonto regarding the fact 
that Mr. Germonto had only recently disclosed new facts in a 
letter to his lawyer. The prosecutor exposed to the jurors 
matters that should have been protected by the attorney-client 
privilege because the letter in question was a privileged 
communication between Mr. Germonto and his attorney. Counsel's 
failure to object to the prosecutor's use of the letter during 
questioning was deficient performance. Furthermore, defense 
counsel failed to object when the issue was against raised during 
the prosecutor's closing argument. In that argument, the 
prosecutor disclosed the content of communication between Mr. 
Germonto and his attorneys both prior to the letter and after the 
letter. Yet no objection was raised. The failure to object was 
deficient performance by Mr. Germonto's counsel. 
Counsels' deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Germonto's 
case. Because of counsels' failure to object, Mr. Germonto was 
shown to be a less credible witness. This case hinged on the 
credibility of Mr. Germonto as perceived by the jury. In essence, 
the jury was told that if Mr. Germonto would not tell the truth to 
his own defense attorneys until a few months prior to trial, he 
should not be viewed as credible during hik testimony to the jury. 
Counsels1 failure to object clearly impugned Mr. Germonto's 
testimony. 
The prosecutor's comments also amounted to improper 
comment on Mr. Germontofs post-arrest sile4ce. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), presents a similar fact situation. In Doyle the 
defendant presented a plausible explanation at trial for his 
allegedly criminal activity. 426 U.S. at 613. The prosecutor 
attempted to impeach the defendant's exculpatory story by asking 
why the defendant had failed to raise the sltory after his arrest. 
The State contended that the need to present the jury all 
information relative to the truth of the petitioner's exculpatory 
story fully justified the cross-examination concerning the 
defendant's prior failure to present the story. In holding that 
such cross-examination violates a defendant1s right to due 
process, the United States Supreme Court st&ted that while the 
Miranda warnings issued when an individual is arrested contain no 
"express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such 
assurance is implicit to any person who receives warnings." 426 
U.S. at 618. The Court also stated that f![^ L]n such circumstances, 
it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process 
to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial." 426 U.S. at 618. 
In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), this Court 
considered a case in which questions concerning the defendant's 
post-arrest silence were posed to the police officer who arrested 
the defendant and during the prosecutor's closing argument. 639 
P.2d at 147. After stating that Doyle was controlling on the 
issue, this Court stated: 
The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put 
the defendant's silence before the jury after his 
having been advised of his right to remain silent 
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. 
The references to defendant's silence are 
fundamental error, which could have affected the 
result and are therefore prejudicial. 
639 P.2d at 147. 
In this case, the prosecutor's cross-examination and 
argument concerning Mr. Germonto's trial defense directly raised 
the fact that Mr. Germonto had remained silent immediately 
following his arrest and up to a few months prior to trial. 
Defense counsel failed to object to any of the questions or 
arguments raised by the prosecutor. 
In Wiswell this Court stated that references to 
defendant's silence are "fundamental" error. If such references 
are fundamental error, then defense counsels' failure to object 
cannot be considered a tactical strategy and must be considered 
deficient performance. Mr. Germonto was prejudiced by his 
counsels' deficiency because without improper reterences the jury 
would not have heard testimony concerning the defendant's post-
arrest silence. As the Supreme Court stated in Doyle,, bringing 
such information to the jury's attention is a violation of due 
process and should not have been allowed in this case. 
B. Defense Counsel Were Ineffective Becausfe They Failed to 
Present the Defense of Voluntary Intoxication. 
During the course of his testimony^ Mr. Germonto indi-
cated that he had taken some "weird speed" a couple of hours prior 
to visiting Mr. Lisonbee. (T.4 at 137) Mrt Germonto testified 
that he had no recollection of what occurred during the scuffle 
which resulted in Mr. Lisonbee's death. In essence, Mr. Germonto 
testified to a defense of voluntary intoxication. However, 
defense counsel did nothing to pursue this defense. No expert 
witnesses were called concerning the potential effects of speed 
and whether Mr. Germonto's testimony concerning a blackout was 
reasonable and could have resulted from the drug. Defense counsel 
offered no jury instruction concerning the defense of voluntary 
intoxication. These failures constituted deficient performance on 
the part of defense counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1990) defines the defense of 
involuntary intoxication: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense 
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is 
an element of the offense; however, if reckless-
ness or criminal negligence establishes an element 
of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk 
because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness 
is immaterial in the prosecution of that offense. 
Voluntary intoxication does not absolve a person from all criminal 
liability, it merely serves to negate a culpable mental state 
and reduce the level of liability• State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 
254, 265-66 (Utah 1988); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah), 
cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). If the voluntary intoxication 
is so great that the defendant's mind has been affected to such an 
extent that he did not have the capacity to form the requisite 
specific intent or purpose to commit the crime charged then the 
crime is reduced. Wood, 648 P.2d at 89. 
In this case, Mr. Germonto testified that his mind had 
been affected by the drug. (T.4 at 130-31) The promulgation of 
the voluntary intoxication defense was not incompatible with the 
self-defense asserted by Mr. Germonto1s attorneys. However, 
because counsel failed to pursue the defense either by calling 
expert witnesses to testify to the validity of the defense or by 
requesting instructions which would have put the issue before the 
jury, Mr. Germonto was deprived of a viable defense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and the preceding briefs 
filed by Salt Lake Legal Defender Association and Frederick Joseph 
Germonto, the defendant, Frederick Joseph Germonto, requests that 
this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new 
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trial or, on the robbery charge, dismissal of the charge. 
Respectfully submitted this /-< day of September, 1992, 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
CURTIS C. 'NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME C&URT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
February 3# 1992 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Lisa J* Remal 
L. Clark Donaldson 
Elizabeth Holbrook 
Ronald S. Fujino 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys at Law 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. No. 900375 
Frederick Joseph Germonto, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
1. Motion to Strike Pro-se Brief is denied. 
2. Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association is advised to 
withdraw as defendant's courisel to represent 
counsel and allow alternative counsel to represent 
defendant. 
3. Alternative counsel is granted 45 days after 
appearance to examine and evaluate briefs and to 
file any additional briefing. 
4. Thereafter, the State shall have 30 days to file 
appellee's brief. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
